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This paper  focuses  on the concept  of  patent  scope,  and  contributes  to  existing  research  in  three  ways.  First,
it offers  a re-examination  of the  construct  and  identiﬁes  two  dimensions  of patent  scope,  (1)  the  number
of  variations  of the  core  inventive  idea  identiﬁed  in  the  patent,  reﬂected  in  the number  of  claims  in the
patent  (e.g.  Merges  and  Nelson,  1994); and (2)  the  positioning  of  those  variations  in the inventive  space,
which  is reﬂected  in the number  of  technological  classes  in  which  patent  examiners  classify  those  claims.
Second,  it  investigates  the  implications  of patent  scope  for  the  ﬁrm’s  subsequent  inventive  performance,
and  ﬁnds  that,  when  the  scope  of a patents  spans  across  a higher  number  of technological  classes,  theatent scope
orward citations
cientiﬁc knowledge
elated inventive experience
extent  to which  the  inventing  ﬁrm itself  succeeds  in  building  on  the  knowledge  underlying  its  own
patent  is  lower.  Third,  it investigates  the  antecedents  of  scope,  and  suggests  that prior  investment  in
scientiﬁc  knowledge  and  in related  inventive  experience  are  two factors  that  affect  the  scope  of the
patents  that  ﬁrms  develop.  The  theoretical  predictions  elaborated  in this  paper  are  supported  by  an
empirical  examination  of a longitudinal  sample  of ﬁrms  in the photonics  industry.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
They can refer to marginal variations to the invention (e.g. the diam-
eter of a component) or to more ‘diverse’ variations – for instance,
to completely different materials of which the same component
1 This example is a simpliﬁcation based on an existing patent in the ﬁeld of pho-
tonics.
2 Patent claims have a similar role both in the context of product and process
innovation. In the ﬁrst case they usually refer to variations to the invention’s com-. Introduction
Let us imagine the inventive space as a space that holds all the
deas that have already been created, as well as and those that have
et to be generated. We  can imagine that each invention occu-
ies a certain area within this inventive space, and its position
eﬂects the technological domain with which it is associated. In
uch a characterization, we can think of a patent as the temporary
ight to exclude others from making, using or selling an inven-
ion positioned in that area of the inventive space in exchange for
ts eventual public disclosure (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; USPTO,
014a). The possession of this right (at least in principle) can allow
n inventor to appropriate the beneﬁts generated from their inven-
ion (Kitch, 1977). However, it would have limited value if it did
ot protect the inventor against mere variations to the original
dea (e.g., Scotchmer, 1991). The patent system addresses this con-
ern by allowing inventors to specify the patent’s ‘full scope’ (Kitch,
977; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997; Levin et al., 1987; Merges
nd Nelson, 1994; Walker, 1995).
Speciﬁcally, a patent application is composed of two main
omponents. The ﬁrst is the speciﬁcation of the invention, which
escribes the techno-economic problem faced by the inventing
rm and provides a “precise characterization of the ‘best mode’ of
∗ Tel.: +44 020 7040 0991; fax: +44 020 7040 8328.
E-mail address: elena.novelli.1@city.ac.uk
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.005
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
solving the problem” (Merges and Nelson, 1994, p. 9). The second
is a set of claims, each of which speciﬁes possible improvements or
variations that could be made to the patented invention to adapt
it for different uses (Merges and Nelson, 1994; Walker, 1995).
Consequently, it corresponds to an additional area of the inventive
space that the applicant claims should be protected by the patent.
For instance, the claim of an invention consisting of an electrical
component that contains magnetic particles and a matrix of ﬁbers1
can specify that the magnetic particles can have a diameter ranging
from about 1 nm to about 10 m.2
The positioning of patent claims in the inventive space can vary.ponents, in the second usually refer to variations to the process that would lead to
similar outcome(s). As the US patent law prohibits ‘omnibus claims’, i.e. those that
are  too general and do not provide clear guidelines as to what would constitute an
infringement (Chiang, 2010; Walker, 1995), inventors are incentivized to specify
explicitly in the claims section the potential variations to the invention that they
consider to be part of the original invention (Walker, 1995). USPTO examiners also
verify that claims refer to “enabling”, “useful” and “operative” variations, in that
they provide an advantage in genuinely solving the problem(s) that the invention
addresses (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2013; USPTO, 2014a).
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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ould be made to adapt the invention to multiple applications. In
patial terms, if such alternatives were speciﬁed in the claims, the
atter would be more distantly positioned from the original inven-
ion than the former. In the US patent system, the positioning of
laims is captured by the technological classes to which the patent
s assigned. When the patent examiners scrutinize the applica-
ion documents, they attribute it to one mandatory classiﬁcation,
ccording to the class of the controlling patent claim, and then also
o a variable number of additional classes, if the additional claims
fall” into other technological domains (USPTO, 2014b).
Building on these premises, this paper offers a re-examination
f the concept of patent scope from the perspective of an inventing
rm, identifying two dimensions to it: (1) the number of variations
o the core inventive idea that are identiﬁed in the patent, which are
eﬂected in the number of its claims (e.g. Merges and Nelson, 1994);
nd (2) the positioning of such variations in the inventive space,
hich is reﬂected in the number of technological classes in which
he patent examiners classify such claims. While patents can vary
long both dimensions, existing research has generally overlooked
his issue. This paper argues that a higher number of claims might
llow the inventing ﬁrm to build on its patented knowledge (e.g.
all et al., 2005; Kitch, 1977; Merges and Nelson, 1994); but, when
he patent claims are classiﬁed across multiple classes, the extent
o which the inventing ﬁrm is itself able to appropriate and build
n the knowledge underlying the patent may  decrease.
Having shown that both these dimensions are important in
ffecting the strength of the protection a patent grants, this paper
ddresses the following questions: What enables the identiﬁca-
ion of a greater number of patent claims, and what determines
he positioning of such claims across a greater number of tech-
ological domains? Surprisingly, there has been limited research
xploring the antecedents of patent scope. In this paper, I build
n research on the role of science in the inventive process (e.g.,
leming and Sorenson, 2004; Narin, 1994; Narin et al., 1997) and
n analogical processes (e.g. Gavetti et al., 2005; Gick and Holyoak,
980; Hofstadter, 2001), and identify ﬁrms’ prior investments in
cientiﬁc knowledge and in related inventive experience as two
actors affecting patent scope. The theoretical predictions elabo-
ated in this paper are supported by an empirical examination of a
ongitudinal sample of ﬁrms in the photonics industry.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section
 I explore the concept of patent scope, its implications and
ntecedents. In Sections 3 and 4, I describe the empirical setting,
ata, econometric speciﬁcations, estimation results, and in Section
 I discuss the paper’s contribution, implications for future research
nd limitations.
. Theory and hypotheses
.1. Patent breadth, patent width and patent scope: prior
heoretical and empirical research
Using slightly different deﬁnitions, prior research has gener-
lly referred to the constructs of ‘patent breadth’, ‘patent width’
r ‘patent scope’ when referring to the level of leniency used by the
egulator in granting exclusion rights to patentees (e.g. Denicolo’,
996; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Green and Scotchmer, 1995;
lemperer, 1990; Matutes et al., 1996; Merges and Nelson, 1990,
994; Scotchmer, 1991). Despite the value of these contributions,
xisting research in this area overlooks some important issues.
First, most of it builds on the idea that – given a certain degree of
eniency on the part of the regulator in examining patent cases – an
nventing ﬁrm will take full advantage of it, for instance by specify-
ng in the patent claims all the possible variations to the invention
hat the regulator is likely to permit. This requires assuming that 44 (2015) 493–507
the full set of possible variations to an invention is known to (or
could easily be identiﬁed by) the inventor at the time of the patent
application (i.e. Merges and Nelson, 1990, 1994). This paper relaxes
this assumption, in that it suggests that the scope of a patent is
also determined by ﬁrms’ ability to identify a higher number of
variations. Because this ability likely varies across ﬁrms, this paper
explores the antecedents of this heterogeneity – which have not
been considered in most prior research.
Second, in investigating the implications of patent scope, most
prior research has focused on its implications for social welfare
(e.g. Denicolo’, 1996; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Klemperer, 1990;
Merges and Nelson, 1990, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991). This paper
extends prior research by showing how the scope of patents affects
the extent to which the inventing ﬁrm is able to build on its own
prior patents compared to other ﬁrms.
Finally, existing research has not provided precise guidance as
to the operational interpretation of the construct of patent scope.
Some studies have suggested that the scope of a patent can be mea-
sured as the number of technological classes in which its claims are
classiﬁed (e.g. Lerner, 1994; Nerkar and Shane, 2003; Shane, 2001),
building on the idea that a patent with broader scope would include
more distant applications. Reﬂecting, instead, the idea that a patent
with a broader scope covers a greater number of variations to the
invention, other studies have measured the scope of a patent as
the number of claims it includes (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman,
1997). This paper extends prior research by recognizing that the
number of claims in a patent, and the number of classes in which
those patent claims are classiﬁed reﬂect different dimensions of
the patent scope construct, and suggests that its operationaliza-
tion should take both dimensions into account. Table 1 provides
a synthesis of prior research on these issues, and compares the
assumptions and ﬁndings of prior studies.
2.2. The implications of patent scope
I argue that both the number of a patent’s claims and their
positioning across classes affect ﬁrms’ ability to appropriate the
‘inventive’ returns from their inventions. Prior literature in this
area has emphasized that all patents embody the opportunity
for further development, and can act as a springboard for future
inventions (Ahuja et al., 2013; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Hall
et al., 2005; Kitch, 1977; Merges and Nelson, 1994; O’Donoghue,
1998; Scotchmer, 1991). Existing research has identiﬁed an associ-
ation between patents’ scope and the subsequent inventive activity
that builds on them, as measured by the number of ‘forward cita-
tions’ the patent receives (e.g. Lerner, 1994). However, this research
does not distinguish between citations received from subsequent
patents developed by the inventing ﬁrm itself (i.e. ‘self-citations’),
and those received from patents developed by others (i.e., ‘exter-
nal’ citations). While self-citations reﬂect the ﬁrm’s internalization
of the knowledge underlying its own inventions (Belenzon, 2012;
Hall et al., 2005; Trajtenberg, 2002), external citations indicate that
other players have internalized part of the knowledge underlying
the original invention and succeeded in building on it. Hence, from
the standpoint of the inventing ﬁrm’s appropriability, the value of
self- and external citations differs substantially.
A deep understanding of both the codiﬁed and tacit knowl-
edge elements underlying the patent should, in principle, give
the original inventing ﬁrm an advantage in conceiving subsequent
developments more easily and more quickly than other ﬁrms (e.g.
Arora, 1996; Giarratana and Mariani, 2014; Katila and Ahuja, 2002).
A higher number of claims should act as a deterrent to other ﬁrms
from building on the knowledge underlying the patent, as it cor-
responds to an increased probability that a new invention in that
area might infringe at least one of the patent’s claims (Kitch, 1977;
Merges and Nelson, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991). It might also reﬂect
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Table 1
Literature overview.
Author(s), Year and
type of
contribution
Key construct relevant to this
paper
Perspective considered Assumptions about the
inventing ﬁrms’ incentives and
the sources of welfare loss
Characteristics of the inventive
process
Key ﬁndings
Klemperer (1990)
Theoretical
Patent width: extent of
similarity allowed by the
regulator between the focal
invention and those developed
by other ﬁrms (“How similar a
drug should a competitor be
allowed to sell?” p. 113)
Policy maker.
The objective is to identify the
optimal patent policy (i.e. the
ideal combination of patent
width and patent length) that
maximizes social welfare
accounting for the inventing
ﬁrm’s incentives
The inventing ﬁrm is
incentivized by the proﬁts at
time t, which are deﬁned as a
function of patent width. Firms
are only allowed to choose
their prices as a function of
patent width, which is set at
the system level
Welfare losses originate from
two  sources: 1. Consumption
switching to less preferred
product varieties;
2. Consumption switching out
from the product category
Innovative activity ceases after
one patent is awarded. Hence,
the inventing ﬁrm’s utility is
affected only by the proﬁts
associated with the product
variety it produces (which
embodies the invention)
Even if increasing the width of
a patent increases the
monopolistic power granted to
the inventing ﬁrm, greater
patent width may be the
optimal choice “if for each
consumer the value of
consuming the preferred
variety is higher than the value
of consuming no variety of the
product by the same monetary
amount” (p. 115)
Gilbert and Shapiro
(1990)
Theoretical
Patent breadth: the ﬂow rate of
proﬁts available to the
patentee while the patent is in
force, which is determined by
the regulator through various
policies (e.g. exclusive
territories, tying arrangements,
antitrust laws. . .). In all cases
breadth translates into the
maximum price that the
patentee can charge for the
product that embodies the
invention
Policy maker.
The objective is to identify the
optimal patent policy (i.e. the
ideal combination of patent
breadth and patent length)
that maximizes social welfare
accounting for the inventing
ﬁrm’s incentives
The inventing ﬁrm is
incentivized by proﬁt at time t,
which corresponds to patent
breadth.
Welfare losses originate from
consumption that is switched
out of the product category
Innovative activity ceases after
one patent is awarded and –
hence – the inventing ﬁrm’s
utility is affected only by
proﬁts associated with the
current invention
In a homogenous good market,
the optimal policy involves
patents of inﬁnite length
whenever increasing the
breadth of the patent is
increasingly costly – in terms
of deadweight loss
Denicolo’ (1996)
Theoretical
Patent breadth: deﬁned by the
various instruments used by
the government to limit the
extent of the monopoly the
inventing ﬁrm enjoys over a
new technology it has
developed (p. 249)
Policy maker.
The objective is to optimize the
inventing ﬁrm’s incentives to
invent as well as social welfare.
It extends earlier literature to
the case in which many ﬁrms
race for a patent
Incentives are not only
determined by the proﬁts
earned by each patentee, but
also by the proﬁts earned by
non-innovators and by the
proﬁts earned after the patent
expires.
In addition to being originated
by reductions in the level of
investment in R&D, social loss
also originates from
inefﬁciencies (i.e. duplication
of entry costs, inefﬁcient
productions . . .)
The paper considers the case of
a  single invention rather than a
sequence of inventions
Narrowing patent breadth
leads to more competition in
the product market; this
increases social welfare only to
the extent that social welfare
increases more rapidly than the
incentives to innovate decrease
as the patent is narrowed. This
depends on the nature of the
competition, which can be
more or less efﬁcient. If
competition is less efﬁcient,
narrowing the breadth of the
patent increases the output of
less efﬁcient ﬁrms
Kitch (1977)
Theoretical
Patent scope: scope “accorded
by the patent system to the
inventing ﬁrm’s patent claims
(p. 267)
Policy maker Contrast between the reward
theory (i.e. patent system as a
device that enables an
inventing ﬁrm to capture the
returns from its investment in
the invention) and the prospect
theory (i.e. patent system as a
device used to increase the
output from resources used for
technological innovation)
Innovative activity is
cumulative
Firms have different types of
knowledge and resources (p.
277) that they can apply in the
invention process. Contracting
can be used to give different
parties different areas to
explore
Patents with a broad scope
should be granted to enable
inventing ﬁrms to develop
their inventions that have a
potential for signiﬁcant
improvement in an orderly
fashion
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author(s), Year and
type of
contribution
Key construct relevant to this
paper
Perspective considered Assumptions about the
inventing ﬁrms’ incentives and
the sources of welfare loss
Characteristics of the inventive
process
Key ﬁndings
Scotchmer (1991),
Green and
Scotchmer
(1995)
Theoretical
Patent breadth: “Leniency of
the courts in interpreting the
novelty requirement of
patents” (Matutes et al., 1996,
p.  80). Compared to the ﬁrst
order invention, increase in
quality required from a second
order invention so that the
second invention does not
constitute an infringement
(Green and Scotchmer, 1995)
Policy maker.
The objective is to investigate
the use of patent protection
and cooperative agreements
among ﬁrms to protect
incentives for cumulative
research
The inventing ﬁrm is
incentivized by proﬁts
generated through ﬁrst- and
second-order inventions,
earned by selling the invention
as  a product, or by licensing it
to  ﬁrms that have developed
products that infringe on the
focal ﬁrms’ patent. Patent
breadth does not change the
per-period joint proﬁts (which
are ﬁxed), but only their
division between sequential
inventing ﬁrms.
Social loss originates from
reductions in the level of
investment in R&D
Innovative activity is
sequential and inventions are
subject to multiple stages of
modiﬁcation and
improvement.
Firms have different types of
expertise that allow them to
develop different applications
of  the ﬁrst invention
Proﬁt erosion due to invention
of  derivative improvements by
other ﬁrms may  be mitigated
by  increasing patent breadth or
by  permitting cooperative
ex-ante agreements. However,
when there is uncertainty
about the value of second order
inventions and cooperation is
permitted, the optimal breadth
can be ﬁnite
Merges and Nelson
(1990, 1994),
Cohen and
Lemley (2001)
Theoretical
Patent scope: “allowed”
breadth of the patents claims,
as  determined by the patent
policy
Policy maker.
The objective is to determine
the patent scope that does not
hinder technical progress
Proﬁts are not exclusively a
function of the breadth of the
patent, but also of superior
design, production and
marketing. Moreover, the
inventing ﬁrm has a natural
advantage in terms of lead
time. In addition, increasing
breadth does not necessarily
provide ﬁrms with incentives
to invent in the area protected
(i.e. ﬁrms sometimes “sit on
their monopoly positions”).
Social loss originates from
reductions in the level of
investment in R&D and from
the consequent limitation of
technical progress
Technical advance is sequential
and connected and often
cumulative.
Heterogeneity in ﬁrms’
capabilities is recognized,
especially in identifying “the
developmental opportunities
associated to an invention”
(Merges and Nelson, 1994; p. 7)
The impact of the breadth of
patents on subsequent
inventing in a ﬁeld depends on
the topography of technical
advantage in a ﬁeld, i.e.
whether technical progress
requires diversity of
capabilities versus express
coordination. The case of the
software industry, studied by
Cohen and Lemley (2001),  is an
example of an industry in
which patents of wide breadth
might be granted, but where
this is unlikely to promote
progress in the industry
Matutes et al.
(1996)
Theoretical
Patent Scope: leniency of the
courts in granting claims of
innovations that are not fully
developed
Policy maker.
The objective is to identify the
ideal combination of patent
scope and patent length taking
into account both the
inventing ﬁrm’s incentives to
invent and social welfare
Inventing ﬁrms are
incentivized by the proﬁts they
can make from the invention in
the “patenting” and
“non-patenting” case. Without
the patent, inventing ﬁrms
have incentives to wait before
they introduce the applications
developed on the basis of their
technology in order to avoid
imitation that can happen
through reverse engineering.
Social loss originates from
delay in the diffusion of the
knowledge related to the basic
innovation (i.e. delayed
disclosure)
Innovative activity is
cumulative. The knowledge
associated with the invention
is necessary to develop further
innovations. The number of
applications that can be
derived from an invention is
part of common knowledge
Scope generates higher levels
of welfare than length because
it  anticipates the period during
which other ﬁrms can
introduce applications of their
own, and because patent
holders have more ﬂexibility to
decide when to exercise their
property rights
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author(s), Year and
type of
contribution
Key construct relevant to this
paper
Perspective considered Assumptions about the
inventing ﬁrms’ incentives and
the sources of welfare loss
Characteristics of the inventive
process
Key ﬁndings
Lerner (1994)
Empirical
Patent Scope: breadth of the
patent protection, represented
by the breadth of claims in
each patent. Operationalized as
the number of technological
classes in which a patent is
classiﬁed
Policy maker/inventing ﬁrm.
The purpose is to empirically
examine the impact of patent
scope on a ﬁrm’s economic
value
By pioneering an empirical
investigation into the construct
of patent scope and its impact
on ﬁrms’ valuation, the paper
provides support for the
theoretical idea that the scope
of patents can exert a relevant
impact on the inventing ﬁrms’
incentives, as well as being an
important policy instrument
The paper reﬂects the
cumulative nature of the
invention process, in that it
investigates the impact of the
scope of a patent on the
subsequent (external) citations
it receives
Broader patent scope (patent
classes) is associated with
greater numbers of external
forward citations; greater
probability of litigation; higher
market valuation of the ﬁrm
Lanjouw and
Schankerman
(1997)
Empirical
Patent Scope: breadth of claims
in each patent. Operationalized
as the number of claims
included in a patent. Number of
patent classes included in the
analyses as a control variable
Policy maker/inventing ﬁrm.
The purpose is to identify the
factors that contribute to
patent litigation and
understand whether patent
litigation dilutes the incentives
provided by the patent system
Not only the returns from
patenting but also its costs (e.g.
the potential costs of litigation)
affect the incentives to invent
The paper reﬂects the
cumulative nature of the
invention process, in that it
investigates the impact of the
scope of a patent on the
subsequent (external) citations
it receives, and on patent
litigation
Patents that are broader in
scope – in the sense that they
embody more claims – will be
more exposed to potential
infringement and thus
litigation. Patents that are
classiﬁed in a higher number of
classes are associated with a
lower probability of litigation
This  paper Patent scope refers to the space
of the exclusion right actually
covered by a patent.
The present paper extends prior
theoretical research in that: it
suggests that the actual area
covered by a patent also
depends on the inventing
ﬁrm’s ability to identify
variations to the core invention
and not just on the regulator’s
leniency.
The paper extends prior
theoretical and empirical
research in that it recognizes
that patent scope can vary
along two  distinct dimensions.
(1) The number of variations to
the core inventive idea
identiﬁed in the patent,
reﬂected in the number of
claims in the patent (e.g.
Merges and Nelson, 1994); and
(2) the positioning of those
variations in the inventive
space, which is reﬂected in the
number of technological
classes in which those claims
are classiﬁed by patent
examiners
The present paper extends prior
research in that:
(1) It takes a ﬁrm (as opposed
to a policy) perspective;
(2) it investigates the impact of
patent scope on ﬁrm’s ability
to build on their patents
compared to other ﬁrms
(3) It explores the antecedents
of patent scope
The strength of protection
provided by the patent varies
depending on both the number
of variations identiﬁed
(included in the patent claims)
and their positioning in the
inventive space (i.e. patent
classes) and it may  affect the
extent to which the inventing
ﬁrm will build on the patent
compared to other ﬁrms
The present paper builds on
Cohen and Lemley (2001),
Green and Scotchmer (1995),
Kitch (1977), Matutes et al.
(1996), Merges and Nelson
(1990, 1994); Scotchmer
(1991) in that:
(1) it recognizes that the
inventive activity does not
cease after the ﬁrst invention,
but rather is cumulative or
sequential; and
(2) it recognizes that ﬁrms have
different types of knowledge
and resources that they can
apply in the invention process.
This paper extends these prior
studies in that it suggests that
ﬁrms’ heterogeneity can also
affect the identiﬁcation of
variations to the core invention
that can be included in the
patent claims (as opposed to
affecting only the development
of subsequent inventions)
Holding other conditions
constant, the higher the
number of claims in the patent
and the lower the number of
technological classes in which
a  patent’s claims are classiﬁed,
the greater the extent to which
the inventing ﬁrm will build on
it compared to other ﬁrms.
The greater the ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc
knowledge, the greater the
number of claims in its patents
and the greater the number of
technological classes its patent
claims will be classiﬁed in.
The greater the ﬁrm’s related
inventive experience, the
greater the number of claims in
its patents and the lower the
number of technological
classes its patent claims will be
classiﬁed in
4  Policy
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he inventing ﬁrm’s strategic intention itself to reduce the likeli-
ood that others can invent in the areas surrounding the patented
nvention.
However, holding the number of claims in a patent constant,
he strength of these mechanisms will be reduced if those claims
re positioned across multiple technological domains. In this case
he focal ﬁrm may  be less likely, compared to other ﬁrms, to have
he internal capabilities or complementary assets required to pur-
ue developments of its invention across all potential domains (e.g.
hang, 1995; Merges and Nelson, 1994; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf,
993). In addition, the more dispersed the domains to which an
nvention contributes are, the more difﬁcult it can be for the focal
rm to focus its attention across all of them (Ocasio, 1997) and the
ess credible it can be that it will do so (Caves, 1984; Lieberman
nd Montgomery, 1988). In fact, the inventing ﬁrm might have
eveloped the patent with a broader technological span with the
ntention of harvesting licensing revenues, rather than to further
echnological developments on all fronts itself (Gambardella et al.,
007; Gans et al., 2008). Patents classiﬁed in more different classes
ill also have greater visibility, and be more likely to ‘cross’ more
rms’ search processes. Hence, they will be more likely to be built
n by others. Thus:
ypothesis 1. Holding other conditions constant, the extent to
hich an inventing ﬁrm will build on its patent compared to other
rms increases with the number of patent claims but decreases
ith the number of technological classes in which the patent’s
laims are classiﬁed.
.3. The antecedents of patent scope: scientiﬁc knowledge and
elated inventive experience
Although many applications of an invention may  only emerge
ver time (Cattani, 2005; Rosenberg, 1998), inventing ﬁrms are
ncentivized to try to identify as many of these variations as possi-
le to increase their pre-emptive advantage over their competitors
Aljalian, 2005; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Chiang, 2010).3 This implies
hinking beyond the particular manifestation of its idea that the
nventing ﬁrm has currently conceived (Kitch, 1977; Merges and
elson, 1994). Hence, I build on the assumption that the identiﬁ-
ation of potential variants to an invention can be facilitated by
he factors that enable the inventing ﬁrm to abstract from that
nvention’s local context, and to scout for potential solutions – or
lements of such solutions – in different settings. I identify two fac-
ors that can lead to this outcome, i.e. the levels of a ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc
nowledge and of related inventive experience in its knowledge
ase.
.3.1. Scientiﬁc knowledge and patent scope
Extant literature has suggested that science can alter the way
he invention search processes operate (e.g., Narin, 1994; Narin
t al., 1997; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). I suggest it can also
ead to the development of a broader scope for patents by facili-
ating abstraction. First, scientiﬁc knowledge provides ﬁrms with a
epertoire of abstract principles derived from general theories and
aws (Arora and Gambardella, 1994a,b; Mowery, 1981; Rosenberg,
990), and greater familiarity with these general principles facil-
tates the abstraction of new technological problems (Bresnahan
nd Gambardella, 1998). Second, using scientiﬁc knowledge in the
nvention process increases the likelihood that inventions are less
3 This statement has also found support in the qualitative evidence collected via
nterviews conducted with patent attorneys as a complement to this study’s quan-
itative analysis. Speciﬁcally, interviewees conﬁrmed that – within the boundaries
f what is reasonable to claim in association with a certain invention – inventing
rms are generally incentivized to identify the highest possible number of claims. 44 (2015) 493–507
contextualized to any speciﬁc application setting in their original
conception, being derived directly from abstract principles (Arora
and Gambardella, 1994b).
The conceptualization of technological problems in abstract
terms fostered by science facilitates the navigation of the techno-
logical environment in multiple directions and the recombination
of different elements of identiﬁed solutions, and so further expands
the overall set of possible solutions to problems (Fleming and
Sorenson, 2004), i.e. the number of potential variations to the core
inventive idea. This suggests that:
Hypothesis 2a. The greater the ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc knowledge, the
greater the number of claims in its patents.
The use of scientiﬁc knowledge in the invention process can
also lead to the identiﬁcation of more distant variations to the
invention. Science gives ﬁrms a quick “glimpse of the possible”
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2004, p. 912), allowing alternative prob-
lems and solutions to be evaluated via an ‘ofﬂine’ search process
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Lippman and McCall, 1976; Nelson,
1959). For instance, the invention of photonic-crystal ﬁbers – a
new class of optical ﬁbers – was  developed through the transfer
of knowledge from the principles of quantum mechanics to the
ﬁeld of optics, and built on the theoretical idea that light could
be trapped in photonics ‘bandgaps’ in a similar way  to how elec-
trons can be trapped in the energy gaps of a lattice (Benabid, 2006;
Russell, 2003). Because scientiﬁc knowledge improves ﬁrms’ ability
to comprehend, assimilate and recombine knowledge from more
distant domains (Gambardella, 1995; Gruber et al., 2013), the dis-
tance of an invention’s variations that can be identiﬁed by relying
on scientiﬁc knowledge is likely to increase. Thus:
Hypothesis 2b. The greater the ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc knowledge, the
greater the number of technological classes its patent claims will
be classiﬁed in.
2.3.2. Related inventive experience and patent scope
Firms can also develop general knowledge schemes from
their actual engagement with concrete experiences (Arora and
Gambardella, 1994a; Cattani, 2005; Fosfuri and Tribo’, 2008;
Gavetti et al., 2005; Hofstadter, 2001; Levinthal and March, 1993;
Levinthal, 1995). When similar problems are encountered several
times, ﬁrms are likely to derive general schemas for understand-
ing and solving problems of that nature, which are then stored in
their knowledge bases (Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Hofstadter, 2001).
Such schemas, and the settings they are derived from, then serve
to identify candidate solutions for the new technological problems
they face (Gavetti et al., 2005; Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Hofstadter,
2001; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989).
Relatedness in the experience accumulated by a ﬁrm increases
the likelihood that a connection between prior experience and a
current problem can be identiﬁed (Gentner and Landers, 1985;
Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989), as well as
the repertoire of potential solutions for that problem (e.g. Cattani,
2005; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). For instance, Corning’s prior
inventive experience in lasers, glass manufacturing and integrated
circuits helped the company identify speciﬁc solutions to develop-
ing the ﬁrst optical ﬁbers (Cattani, 2006). This will facilitate the
identiﬁcation of useful variations to the invention’s ‘best mode’
and, consequently, increase the number of claimed variations the
inventing ﬁrm can incorporate in its patent documents. Hence:
Hypothesis 3a. The greater the ﬁrm’s related inventive experi-
ence, the greater the number of claims in its patents.
However, relatedness in the ﬁrm’s inventive experience is likely
to reduce the distance between the variations identiﬁed. First, the
relatedness of source settings can lead to an increase in similarity
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etween the possible responses identiﬁed in the ﬁrst place. Sec-
nd, more experience in certain domains might create a form
f “cognitive myopia” toward more distant domains (Cohen and
evinthal, 1990, 1994; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1988).
hird, related experiences are likely to share many contextual
lements, hence the generality of the maps and structures of
henomena derived from it – and the degree to which such maps
an be effective as guides to approaching more distant contexts –
ight be lower (Hofstadter, 2001; Holland et al., 1989; Newell and
imon, 1972).
At the same time, past exploitation in a certain domain makes
uture exploitation within that same domain even more efﬁcient, so
ncreasing the opportunity cost of exploration beyond that domain,
nd reducing the incentives to explore more widely (Levinthal and
arch, 1993). Hence, the greater the level of related inventive expe-
ience in a ﬁrm’s knowledge base, the less likely it is that it will
ngage in a broader search for variations to an invention, and thus:
ypothesis 3b. The greater the ﬁrm’s related inventive expe-
ience, the lower the number of technological classes its patent
laims will be classiﬁed in.
. Empirical context, methods and measures
.1. Photonics
The empirical analysis is conducted on ﬁrms active in the
hotonics arena. Photonics is the technology of generating and har-
essing light and other forms of radiant energy whose quantum
nit is the photon (The Photonics Directory, 2014). The word ‘pho-
onics’ appeared in the late 1960s to describe a research ﬁeld whose
oal was to use light to perform functions that typically fell within
he electronics domain, such as telecommunications and informa-
ion processing. The broad span of photonics’ applications ranges
rom energy generation to detection, communications and infor-
ation processing, and includes technologies for the generation,
mission, transmission, modulation, signal processing, switching,
mpliﬁcation and detection or sensing of light.
Both scientiﬁc and technical knowledge are important in this
eld. The basic scientiﬁc knowledge underlying photonics draws
rom physics and engineering, but a broad range of scientiﬁc knowl-
dge bases are used within the ﬁeld, including chemicals, material
cience, astronomy, optics and electronics. The photonics indus-
ry includes both small and large ﬁrms – specialized players as
ell as generalists. Firms’ inventive experience also varies in this
ndustry, because photonics components and products are used in
ultiple applications, such as material processing, signal analy-
is, imaging. During the period covered by the current study the
eld was known for its level of innovation (Stuck, 1998; Teich and
aleh, 1991). Patenting inventions is a common practice in pho-
onics (Fearnside, 2007) and the question of the scope of patents is
articularly meaningful in this ﬁeld, where the level of standard-
zation is low for many technologies – hence ﬁrms have greater
reedom in choosing how to address each technological problem
hey face. Detailed information about the industry was  collected
rom a set of ﬁfteen interviews with industry experts, photonics
cientists and academics, and patent attorneys in the United States
nd Europe. The qualitative data collected during these interviews
ere also used to validate the theory and the operationalization of
he constructs developed in this study, as well as to support the
nterpretation of its results..2. Sample and data
To test the hypotheses, I built a longitudinal data set contain-
ng information about a sample of photonics ﬁrms over a ten-year 44 (2015) 493–507 499
period (1993–2002). To deﬁne photonics and its boundaries I relied
on an industry directory (The Photonics Directory, by Laurin Pub-
lishing), which lists all companies active in photonics’ subﬁelds. I
selected all U.S. companies listed in the directory between 1993
and 2002, and extracted information on their key characteristics
(e.g., independence status, size, age, location) for each year. The
sample included both private and public ﬁrms, and so is generally
representative of the different categories of ﬁrms active in high-
technology contexts. It also included ﬁrms that entered or exited
the industry during the period, limiting any survival bias.
I used ﬁrms’ names and locations and matched them to patent
assignee’s names in the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) patents database. The NBER data set provides patent data
consolidated at the parent portfolio level for public ﬁrms. For pri-
vate ﬁrms, I used the D&B Who  Owns Whom database to build a list
of their worldwide subsidiaries for each year of the study. I then
matched this list with the NBER data set to obtain the list of patents
ﬁled by each of the ﬁrm’s subsidiaries, and ﬁnally, consolidated the
list of patents at the parent ﬁrm level. This procedure resulted in
the selection of 88,528 patents, held by 656 ﬁrms.
3.3. Variable deﬁnitions and operationalization
3.3.1. Number of variations to the invention and their positioning
across technological domains
In the theory section of this paper I identiﬁed two core dimen-
sions deﬁning patent scope, i.e. the number of variations to an
invention and the positioning of those variations across multiple
technological classes. Following existing research, I operational-
ized the ﬁrst dimension as the number of claims in the patent
(i.e. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997; Merges and Nelson, 1994;
Walker, 1995), information which I collected from the NBER patent
dataset. I collected (from Google Patents) the number of unique
three-digit technological classes in which each patent’s claims were
classiﬁed at the time of the patent application as reﬂecting the
positioning of those claims across technological classes (USPTO,
2014b). I computed this measure using the USPTO patent classi-
ﬁcation, which provides two  beneﬁts relative to the International
Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC). First, it only classiﬁes patents accord-
ing to their claims – rather than considering the complete patent
documentation (Gruber et al., 2013; USPTO, 2014b) – and, sec-
ond, it emphasizes an invention’s technical focus as opposed to its
industrial uses (Lerner, 1994; USPTO, 2014b). Hence, the USPTO
classiﬁcation is appropriate to study how a ﬁrm’s knowledge base
leads to the development of the technical knowledge embodied in
its patent claims.
3.3.2. Forward self-citations
Consistent with previous research, I used the total number of
forward self-citations a patent receives as a measure of the ability of
the inventing ﬁrm to internalize and build on its early knowledge
(e.g. Hall et al., 2005). As forward citations are subject to trun-
cation issues, I calculated this measure using two alternative time
windows, i.e. a ﬁxed four-year time window from the year of the
patent grant, and the full time window from the date of the patent
grant through to 2006. These windows are shorter than the full
patent term, so the forward citations I considered occurred while
the patent rights were still valid, allowing me  to investigate the
extent to which a patent’s scope was  effective in protecting the
knowledge embodied in its claims from spilling over to other ﬁrms.
3.3.3. Scientiﬁc knowledge and related inventive experience
I  referred to the characteristics of a ﬁrm’s patents from year
t − 5 to t − 1 (where t is the year of the focal patent application)
as indirect indicators of the characteristics of its knowledge base
in the years before that application (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001;
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to a ﬁrm’s economic performance.
To check the robustness of these results, I have run several alter-
native models. First, in Model 4.5, I replicated the same analyses on
a subsample of patents in photonics technological classes only.4
4 The USPTO classiﬁcation does not include a speciﬁc class for photonics patents. I
relied on the assumption that if photonics ﬁrms had the same probability of patent-
ing in any US patent class as all other ﬁrms, the proportion of patents applied in
each class by photonics ﬁrms to the total number of patents they applied for should
(in principle) be equal to the proportion of patents applied in that class by all ﬁrms
in the NBER database to the total number of patents applied across all classes by all00 E. Novelli / Research
rgote, 1999; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). The construct of scien-
iﬁc knowledge refers to the inﬂuence of science in the invention
rocess. Previous studies have emphasized that references to sci-
ntiﬁc articles provide a reasonable indicator of the inﬂuence of
cience on the inventive process (Brusoni et al., 2005; Fleming and
orenson, 2004; Narin et al., 1997; Tijssen, 2001). To measure this
onstruct, I used the proportion of patents in the ﬁrm’s knowledge
ase prior to year t which cited scientiﬁc articles to the total num-
er of its patents. As a robustness check, I also calculated the total
umber of references to scientiﬁc articles in the ﬁrm’s patents prior
o year t. To calculate these variables I collected the full text of non-
atent references in the ﬁrm’s patents from the Patent Data Verse
atabase (Lai et al., 2011) and then selected only the references to
cientiﬁc articles using a combination of a search algorithm and
anual checks.
The construct of prior related inventive experience,  in contrast,
ertains to the amount of experience in a ﬁrm’s knowledge base
elated to the focal invention. To assess whether a patent in the
rm’s portfolio was related to the focal patent, I used the classiﬁ-
ation developed by Hall et al. (2001), who reclassiﬁed the main
SPTO three-digit patent classes into a set of two-digit technologi-
al subcategories, based on the extent to which they relate to each
ther. I calculated this measure as the proportion of patents that
ere assigned to a primary technological class related to that of
he focal patent to the total number of patents the ﬁrm applied for
n the years prior to year t. As a robustness check, I also calculated
his measure as the total number of related patents applied by the
rm in the years prior to t.
.3.4. Controls
The analyses controlled for ﬁrm size, i.e. the number of its
mployees in year t, ﬁrm age, i.e. the number of years elapsed from
ts establishment to year t, and ﬁrm’s knowledge stock, i.e. the num-
er of patents for which it had applied over the ﬁve years before
ear t. To control for ﬁrms’ differential ability to leverage their
rior experience in the inventive process, I included the variable
nowledge leverage, i.e. the proportion of self-citations over the total
umber of backward citations appearing in the ﬁrm’s patents dur-
ng years t − 1 to t − 5 (adapted to the context of this study from the
everage measure used by Cattani, 2005). I included controls for the
ovelty of the technology, as the exploration of novel technolog-
cal areas offers ﬁrms opportunities to preempt a higher number
f ‘spots’ in the inventive space with variations to their inventions,
eading to the identiﬁcation of a higher number of claims. Such
laims could potentially be assigned to multiple technology classes,
ue to lack of established technological knowledge to guide the
atent examiners (e.g. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,
000). But, when the technology underlying the invention is more
ovel, the number and diversity of variations to an invention may
e lower, due to the fact that more novel contexts are character-
zed by greater uncertainty, and most of the connections with other
echnological domains will still be unknown.
To capture – at the patent level – the extent to which the ﬁrm
ad developed the patent by elaborating on established versus
ore recent knowledge, I introduced the variable technological
ovelty, i.e. the inverse of the median age in years of the patent’s
ackward citations (Oriani and Sobrero, 2008). I also included
echnology life cycle ﬁxed effects for each technological domain.
ach technology life cycleij ﬁxed effect equals 1 if the patent appli-
ation year equals i and the technology class of the patent equals
, (with i = 1. . .I, and j = 1. . .J,  where I equals 10 years in the sample
nd J equals 410 technology classes represented in the sample
peciﬁed at the three-digit US classiﬁcation level), and 0 otherwise.
o control for any remaining source of unobserved heterogeneity
 included ﬁrm and industry subﬁeld ﬁxed effects in the analysis. 44 (2015) 493–507
Table 2 shows the variables and descriptive statistics, and Table 3
shows the correlations between the main variables in the analysis.
3.4. Model estimation and econometric issues
I use a linear regression model at the patent level of analysis
to test Hypothesis 1, where I estimate the number of self-citations
received by a patent as a function of the number of claims,  the num-
ber of classes,  a set of control variables (ﬁrm scientiﬁc knowledge,
ﬁrm related inventive experience,  ﬁrm knowledge stock, technologi-
cal novelty, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, ﬁrm knowledge leverage, total forward
citation) and ﬁrm-, subﬁeld and technology life cycle – ﬁxed effects.
To test Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 2b and 3b I use two linear regression
models at the patent level where the dependent variables are,
respectively, patent claims and patent classes. These variables are
estimated as a function of the ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc knowledge, ﬁrm related
inventive experience,  the control variables (ﬁrm knowledge stock,
technological novelty, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, ﬁrm knowledge leverage)
and ﬁrm-subﬁeld and technology life cycle-ﬁxed effects.  In the linear
regression models, I took the natural logarithm of all the variables
on the right and left hand sides of the equations to address any
skewness in the data.
4. Estimation results and robustness checks
4.1. Patent scope and self-citations
Table 4 reports the result of the models in which the dependent
variable is the number of self-citations a patent receives. Model
4.1 is the baseline model and includes all the control variables.
The two  independent variables, i.e. number of claims and number of
classes,  are added separately in Models 4.2 and 4.3, while Model 4.4
includes them both. Results from the full model (4.4) show that the
number of self-citations a patent receives is positively associated
with the number of claims in it (  ˇ = 0.014; p < 0.01), but is nega-
tively associated with the number of patent classes it is assigned
to (  ˇ = −0.020; p < 0.01): these results support Hypothesis 1. This
implies that, at the sample mean of both the dependent and the
independent variables, an increase of one standard deviation in the
number of claims in a patent is associated with an increase of 2.8%
in the number of self-citations, and, conversely, an increase of one
standard deviation in the number of classes is associated with a
decrease in the number of self-citations of 2.75%. These effects are
highly signiﬁcant, even though their magnitude is not very large. It
must be taken into account that the effects are estimated at the indi-
vidual patent level, and so may  have greater economic signiﬁcance
for ﬁrms holding large portfolios of patents. In addition, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the economic value of inventions building on
a ﬁrm’s patents is not linearly related to their number: even a few
very successful follow-up inventions can contribute considerablyﬁrms in the NBER database. However, if these two proportions differed (with the
ﬁrst  proportion being higher) this could be interpreted as indicating that photonics
ﬁrms had an higher propensity to patent in that class compared to other ﬁrms in the
NBER database, and that that class was particularly relevant to the photonics indus-
try.  I referred to the non-consolidated sample of corporate entities directly active in
E. Novelli / Research Policy 44 (2015) 493–507 501
Table  2
Descriptive statistics.
Description Obs Mean S.D. Min  Max
Patent scope
Number of claims Patent level. Number of claims in the patent 88,528 15.516 11.881 1.000 318.000
Number of classes Patent level. Number of unique technological
classes in which the claims of the patent are
classiﬁed
88,528 1.577 0.831 1.000 10.000
Antecedents
Firm  scientiﬁc knowledge
(from t − 5 to t − 1)
Firm-year level. Number of patents applied by
the ﬁrm in years from t − 5 to t − 1 citing
scientiﬁc articles over the total number of
patents applied by the ﬁrm in years from t − 5
to t − 1
88,528 0.077 0.062 0.000 1.000
Firm  related inventive
experience (from t − 5 to
t − 1)
Firm-year-technology level. Number of patents
in technological classes related to the one of
the focal patent applied by the ﬁrm in years
from t − 5 to t − 1 over the total number of
patents applied by the ﬁrm in years from t − 5
to t − 1
88,528 0.141 0.158 0.000 1.000
Implications
Self-forward citations
(from t to t + 4)
Patent level. Number of self-citations received
by  the patent from t (time of the patent grant)
to t + 4
88,528 0.620 1.980 0.000 54.000
Total  forward citations
(from t to t + 4)
Patent level. Number of total forward citations
received by the patent from t (time of the
patent grant) to t + 4
88,528 4.857 7.843 0.000 176.000
Controls
Firm  knowledge stock
(from t − 5 to t − 1)
Firm-year level. Number of patents applied by
the ﬁrm in the years from t − 5 to t − 1
88,528 3185.358 2416.666 0.500 9764.874
Technological novelty Patent level. Inverse of the median age (in
years) of the patent’s backward citations
88,528 0.605 0.227 0.056 1.000
Firm  size Firm-year level. Number of employees in year t 88,528 3933.585 14,127.840 2.000 480,000.000
Firm  age Firm-year level. Number of years elapsed from
the ﬁrm’s establishment to year t
88,528 60.710 32.212 1.000 180.000
Firm  knowledge leverage Firm-year level. Number of backward citations
made by the ﬁrm to its own patents (in the
patents applied by the ﬁrm in years from t − 5
to t − 1) over the total number of backward
citations appearing in the patents applied by
the ﬁrm in years from t − 5 to t − 1
88,528 0.125 0.079 0.000 0.600
Table 3
Pairwise correlations between variables (N = 88,528).a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Number of claims 1.000
2.  Number of classes 0.030 1.000
3.  Firm scientiﬁc knowledge (from t − 5 to t − 1) 0.115 0.060 1.000
4.  Firm related inventive experience (from t − 5 to t − 1) 0.091 −0.073 0.056 1.000
5.  Self-forward citations (from t to t + 4) 0.085 0.002 0.026 0.063 1.000
6.  Total forward citations (from t to t + 4) 0.110 0.048 0.103 0.007 0.432 1.000
7.  Firm knowledge stock (from t − 5 to t − 1) −0.107 −0.070 −0.166 −0.219 −0.069 −0.105 1.000
8.  Technological novelty −0.036 −0.010 −0.045 0.016 0.048 0.007 −0.161 1.000
9.  Firm size −0.002 0.020 0.026 −0.034 0.046 0.026 −0.013 0.073 1.000
10.  Firm age −0.037 −0.003 −0.109 −0.185 0.032 −0.026 0.091 0.072 0.222 1.000
11.  Firm knowledge leverage −0.071 −0.003 −0.
a Correlation coefﬁcients with absolute value greater than 0.003 are signiﬁcant at the 95%
at  the 99% level.
photonics and identiﬁed the set of three-digit primary US technological classes in
which these companies patented. For each technological class j identiﬁed in the non-
consolidated sample, I calculated the proportion of patents in that class to the total
number of patents in the sample across all J classes,
(
nPHj/
∑J
j=1nPHj
)
in the period
under consideration. I calculated the same proportion using all patents in the NBER
database,
(
nNBERj/
∑J
j=1nNBERj
)
, referring to the same set of classes J in the same
period). I then compared these two  proportions, using a z test to assess whether the
difference between them was statistically signiﬁcant. I retained in the sample all the
classes that satisﬁed two  conditions: (1) nPHj/
∑J
j=1nPHj > nNBERj/
∑J
j=1nNBERj; (2)
the difference was statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. This procedure
resulted in the selection of 74 classes (details available on request).199 −0.063 0.094 −0.029 0.140 0.066 0.026 0.374 1.000
 level; correlation coefﬁcients with absolute value greater than 0.007 are signiﬁcantSecond, Model 4.6 reports the results of the analyses conducted
using the full time window available after the patent grant to cal-
culate the number of forward citations patents received.5 Third,
5 For comparison purposes, in Model 4.7 I use the number of external citations
received by a patent as the dependent variable. Consistent with the theory developed
in this paper, the results show that an increase in patent claims is associated with a
decrease in the number of external forward citations received by the patent, while
an  increase in the number of patent classes is associated with an increase in the
number of external citations it received. Model 4.8 considers the total number of
forward citations received by the patent as the dependent variable, and the results
show that both claims and classes are positively associated with it.
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Table 4
Linear regression estimates of patents’ self-forward citations.a
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Sample  All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
Photonics
patents, four
year window
from patent
grant date
All patents, full
window from
patent grant
date
All patents, full
window from
patent grant
date
All patents, full
window from
patent grant
date
Variables Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + external
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + total
forward
citations)
Ln(number of claims)
0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.020*** −0.004*** 0.126***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Ln(number of classes)
−0.019*** −0.020*** −0.015*** −0.017*** 0.015*** 0.111***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm scientiﬁc
knowledge)
−0.530*** −0.540*** −0.528*** −0.537*** −0.683*** −0.689*** 0.131*** −0.279*
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.114) (0.096) (0.046) (0.146)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm rel. inv.
experience)
0.300*** 0.298*** 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.252*** 0.336*** −0.151*** 0.111***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.012) (0.037)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm knowledge
stock)
−0.063*** −0.065*** −0.063*** −0.065*** −0.050*** −0.056*** 0.029*** −0.098***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.017)
Ln(1  + technological
novelty)
0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.031** −0.021*** −0.075***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024)
Ln(ﬁrm size)
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004 0.005** −0.006*** −0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Ln(ﬁrm age)
0.059 0.061 0.059 0.060 −0.006 0.004 −0.034 −0.198***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.061) (0.044) (0.024) (0.072)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm knowledge
leverage)
−1.239*** −1.230*** −1.237*** −1.227*** −1.560*** −1.387*** 0.257*** −1.509***
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.208) (0.157) (0.087) (0.247)
Ln(1  + total forward
citations)
0.257*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.218*** 0.280*** 0.932***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Firm  ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Subﬁeld ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology life cycle
ﬁxed effects
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant
−0.198  −0.390** −0.354** −0.385** 0.000 −0.417** 0.178** 1.526***
(0.169) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.241) (0.180) (0.090) (0.274)
Observations 88,528 88,528 88,528 88,528 51,156 88,528 88,528 88,528
R-squared 0.370 0.371 0.370 0.371 0.327 0.382 0.934 0.347
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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ecause many patents receive zero self-citations, in the linear
egression models I used a log-transformed measure of the depend-
nt variable plus 1. To control for the robustness of the results
gainst the use of this transformation, I replicated the analyses
sing two additional models. First, I considered the count of self-
orward citations as the dependent variable in a Negative Binomial
egression model with robust standard errors (reported in Table 5,
odel 5.1). Second, in Model 5.2, I considered the proportion of self-
orward citations to the total number of forward citations received
y the patent as an alternative dependent variable, and estimated
he results using a fractional logit regression model (Papke and
ooldridge, 1996). The results of all these alternative speciﬁcations
upport the results reported in Table 4.
.2. Scientiﬁc knowledge, related inventive experience and patent
cope
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the models in which the
umber of claims in the patent is a function of ﬁrm scientiﬁc knowl-
dge and related inventive experience (and other control variables).
peciﬁcally, Model 6.1 includes the control variables only, and Mod-
ls 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 add the independent variables sequentially.
he estimates in the full model (6.4) suggest that both scientiﬁc
nowledge and related inventive experience are positively associ-
ted with the number of claims included in the patent (  ˇ = 0.663,
 < 0.01;  ˇ = 0.065, p < 0.05, respectively), supporting Hypotheses 2aand 3a. Hence, at the sample mean of both the dependent and the
independent variables, an increase of one standard deviation in
the level of the ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc knowledge is associated with an
increase of 3.8% in the number of patent claims, while an increase
of one standard deviation in the level of related inventive experi-
ence is associated with an increase of 0.90% in the number of claims
in a patent.
Table 7 reports the results of the model speciﬁcations in which
the number of patent classes are estimated as a function of ﬁrm
scientiﬁc knowledge and related inventive experience. Model 7.1
reports the control variables only and models 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 add
the independent variables sequentially. The coefﬁcients in the full
model (7.4) show that the number of patent classes is positively
associated with scientiﬁc knowledge (  ˇ = 0.155, p < 0.05), but neg-
atively associated with related inventive experience (  ˇ = −0.271,
p < 0.01), results which support Hypotheses 2b and 3b. The esti-
mates imply that, at the sample mean of both the dependent and
independent variables, an increase of one standard deviation in the
level of scientiﬁc knowledge is associated with an increase in the
number of classes of 0.89% compared to the average value. In con-
trast, an increase of one standard deviation in the level of related
inventive experience at the mean value of the sample is associated
with a decrease of 3.75% in the number of classes in a patent, com-
pared to the average value. Once again, these effects are calculated
at the level of the individual patent, and so might be more relevant
for ﬁrms that hold large patents portfolios.
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Table  5
Negative binomial and fractional logit regression estimates of patents’ self-forward citations.a
5.1 5.2
Negative binomial regression Fractional logit regression
Sample All patents, four year window from patent grant date All patents, full window from patent grant date
Variables Self-forward citations Proportion of self-forward citations to total forward citations
Ln(number of claims)
0.043*** 0.043***
(0.010) (0.013)
Ln(number of classes)
−0.081*** −0.132***
(0.017) (0.022)
Ln(1 + ﬁrm scientiﬁc
knowledge)
−1.030*** −1.191**
(0.349) (0.469)
Ln(1 + ﬁrm rel. inv.
experience)
1.291*** 1.520***
(0.089) (0.120)
Ln(1 + ﬁrm knowledge
stock)
−0.349*** −0.411***
(0.037) (0.050)
Ln(1 + technological
novelty)
0.207*** 0.151**
(0.054) (0.074)
Ln(ﬁrm size)
0.051*** 0.053***
(0.008) (0.010)
Ln(ﬁrm age)
0.382*** 0.689***
(0.142) (0.206)
Ln(1 + ﬁrm knowledge
leverage)
0.059 −0.706
(0.480) (0.687)
Ln(1 + total forward
citations)
1.288***
(0.008)
Firm ﬁxed effects Included Included
Subﬁeld ﬁxed effects Included Included
Time ﬁxed effectsb Included Included
Technology ﬁxed effectsb Included Included
Constant
−5.240*** −3.226***
(0.897) (1.033)
Observations 88,528 66,687
Log  likelihood −64,950.284 −20,259.79781
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
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b These models did not converge when the technology lifecycle ﬁxed effects were i
hese  models include time- and technology class-ﬁxed effects (speciﬁed at the thre
To test the robustness of these results, I replicated the analyses
escribed in Tables 6 and 7 on a subsample of patents in pho-
onics technological classes (see note 4) in models 6.5 and 7.5,
espectively. In models 6.6 and 7.6, respectively, I replicate the
nalyses using the alternative measures for the core independent
ariables. The robustness of these results should also be evaluated
gainst possible alternative explanations. One such explanation is
hat ﬁrms’ knowledge bases and patenting behaviors might be char-
cterized by patterns speciﬁc to certain technological classes, and
ot related to the mechanisms outlined in the hypotheses. How-
ver, the use of both ﬁrm and technological life cycle ﬁxed effects
n the analyses mitigates this risk. A second potential alternative
xplanation is that ﬁrms that have unrelated experience include
unrelated’ knowledge inputs in their patents’ claims – material
hat is only loosely connected to the invention – and so they are
ventually assigned to more different technological classiﬁcations.
owever, this alternate explanation was ruled out by the inter-
iews conducted with the patent attorneys, who explained that,
hile inventors have the incentive to increase the number of claims
n their patent applications, if the claims did not reﬂect ‘mean-
ngful’ variations to the invention, they would be rejected by the
atent examiners, delaying the overall patenting process and hence
enerating substantial losses for those inventors.
. Discussion and conclusions
.1. Core ﬁndings, previous research and implications for future
esearch
This paper makes four contributions to the literature on patent
cope. First, while most of the prior literature in this area hased. Hence, to control for time- and technology-class level unobserved heterogeneity
t US classiﬁcation level).
focused on the changes to the size of the inventive area covered
by the patent rights determined by patent policy (e.g. Cohen and
Lemley, 2001; Denicolo’, 1996; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Green
and Scotchmer, 1995; Kitch, 1977; Klemperer, 1990; Merges and
Nelson, 1990, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991), this paper suggests that the
scope of patents also depends on ﬁrms’ ability to identify a higher
number of variations to their inventions that they can include in
their patent claims. From a policy standpoint, this consideration
implies that changes in the level of the regulator’s leniency in the
examination of inventions will not have the same impact for all
inventing ﬁrms, as prior research has assumed. For instance, ﬁrms
with low ability to identify variations to their inventions will not
beneﬁt much if the regulator applied greater tolerance in accept-
ing patent claims. In contrast, a reduction in the regulator’s leniency
would penalize ﬁrms with greater ability to identify variations to
their inventions more than ﬁrms with lesser ability to do so. It
would be interesting for future research to investigate how this
may  affect the expected levels of social welfare.
Second, this paper shows that the extent to which the inven-
tive ﬁrm itself builds on the knowledge underlying its patents is
lower when its claims span across multiple technological classes.
This allows us to better qualify the fundamental assumption of the
existing literature – that broader scope is associated with a greater
protection for the inventing ﬁrm (e.g. Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990;
Kitch, 1977; Klemperer, 1990). Identifying claims falling across
multiple classes might not necessarily provide the inventing ﬁrm
with an advantage, as it might lead it to reveal connections of the
inventive idea across a broader set of domains, while ﬁnding that
it lacked the complementary capabilities, resources or the span of
attention to pursue all those opportunities itself.
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Table 6
Linear regression estimate of patents’ claims.a
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear regression Linear
regression
All  patents All patents All patents All patents Photonics patents All patents
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(1 + ﬁrm scientiﬁc knowledge)
0.659*** 0.663*** 0.552***
(0.137) (0.137) (0.170)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm related inventive
experience)
0.063* 0.065** 0.210***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.044)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm scientiﬁc knowledge,
alternative measure)
0.100***
(0.012)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm related inventive,
alternative measure)
0.011***
(0.003)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm knowledge stock)
0.169*** 0.162*** 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.208*** 0.066***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Ln(1  + technological novelty)
−0.056*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.084*** −0.057***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
Ln(ﬁrm size)
−0.011*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.008* −0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Ln(ﬁrm age)
−0.102 −0.098 −0.100 −0.095 −0.130 −0.071
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.098) (0.069)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm knowledge leverage)
−0.983*** −0.794*** −0.992*** −0.802*** −1.434*** −0.589***
(0.212) (0.216) (0.212) (0.217) (0.290) (0.218)
Firm  ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Subﬁeld ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology life cycle ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant
2.388*** 2.382*** 2.373*** 2.367*** 2.119*** 2.572***
(0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.273) (0.382) (0.273)
Observations 88,528 88,528 88,528 88,528 51,156 88,528
R-squared 0.163 0.164 0.163 0.164 0.148 0.164
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 7
Linear regression estimates of patents’ classes.a
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear regression Linear
regression
All  patents All patents All patents All patents Photonics patents All patents
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(1 + ﬁrm scientiﬁc knowledge)
0.172** 0.155** 0.223**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.092)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm related inventive
experience)
−0.272*** −0.271*** −0.238***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm scientiﬁc knowledge,
alternative measure)
0.018***
(0.007)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm related inventive,
alternative measure)
−0.034***
(0.002)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm knowledge stock)
0.002 −0.000 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Ln(1  + technological novelty)
−0.029** −0.028** −0.027** −0.027** −0.005 −0.024**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Ln(ﬁrm size)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Ln(ﬁrm age)
−0.020 −0.018 −0.030 −0.029 −0.054 −0.021
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.040)
Ln(1  + ﬁrm knowledge leverage)
0.012 0.061 0.050 0.095 0.281* 0.083
(0.128) (0.130) (0.127) (0.130) (0.164) (0.131)
Firm  ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Subﬁeld ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology life cycle ﬁxed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant
0.285* 0.284* 0.349** 0.347** 0.928*** 0.264
(0.168) (0.168) (0.169) (0.169) (0.211) (0.168)
Observations 88,528 88,528 88,528 88,528 51,156 88,528
R-squared 0.205 0.205 0.207 0.207 0.170 0.208
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Third, this paper investigates the antecedents of patent scope,
hus complementing prior research which has largely focused on
ts implications (e.g. Dechenaux et al., 2008; Gambardella and
iarratana, 2013; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997; Lerner, 1994;
hane, 2001). It suggests that ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in some fac-
ors – such as scientiﬁc knowledge – that strengthen the protection
rovided by the patent by increasing the number of patent claims
ay  be mixed, because such investments also increase the chances
hat those claims span multiple domains, an outcome that might
ncrease knowledge spill-overs to other ﬁrms. Nevertheless, some
rms might still be willing to develop patents spanning multiple
omains, as it must be recognized that inventions by other ﬁrms
hat build on a focal ﬁrm’s knowledge might not always constitute
 bad outcome for the focal ﬁrm. For instance, Belenzon (2012)
uggests that ﬁrms are sometimes able to reabsorb their spilled
nowledge in subsequent periods, together with knowledge about
he developments made by external inventors: this can act as a
echanism to help them escape the no-growth trap and achieve
ong term returns. In addition, inventions spawned by others might
omplement the original invention (Ahuja et al., 2013; Walsh et al.,
003).
Finally, this paper provides a new reﬂection on the operational-
zation of the construct of patent scope. While prior research in
his area has used both patent claims and patent classes as alter-
ative measures of patent scope (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman,
997, 2004; Lerner, 1994; Merges and Nelson, 1994; Shane, 2001),
his study suggests that, rather, they reﬂect different dimensions.
laims reﬂect the number of variations identiﬁed to an initial core
nvention; classes reﬂect the extent to which these variations are
pread out in the technological space. The results of this study shed
ew light on the interpretation of previous empirical results that
ave used the number of technological classes in which the patent
laims are classiﬁed as a measure of patent scope. For example,
rior studies show that broader patent scope (measured as the
umber of IPC classes) is associated with a higher likelihood that a
icensed invention will be commercialized as a product (Dechenaux
t al., 2008), or by the establishment of a new ﬁrm (Shane, 2001).
long the same line of reasoning, Nerkar and Shane’s (2003) results
how that start-ups that have their patents classiﬁed in a higher
umber of classes are less likely to fail, although this effect is
educed in more concentrated industries, where the possession
f marketing and manufacturing agreements are relatively more
mportant to ﬁrm’s survival. In a similar vein, Lerner (1994) pre-
icts and shows that broader scope is positively associated with
he valuations placed on ﬁrms during the venture capital invest-
ent process. On the contrary, Harhoff et al. (2003) investigate the
elationship between the number of IPC classes in which a patent is
lassiﬁed and the patent’s value, measured through a self-assessed
easure (‘how much did the patent contribute to the future pro-
tability of the enterprise’), and ﬁnd that the relationship between
hese two variables is consistently insigniﬁcant across all speciﬁ-
ations.
These prior studies have built on the theoretical intuition
hat patents with broader scope should enjoy stronger protec-
ion against the risk of imitation. However, the results from this
aper emphasize that, holding constant the number of claims,
hen the scope of patents spans multiple classes, ﬁrms’ ability
o build on them compared to other ﬁrms is lower; this might
otentially even reduce the likelihood of the focal ﬁrm success-
ully commercializing the invention, in that other ﬁrms might have
uperior ability to build on that invention relative to the focal ﬁrm.
urther, follow-up inventions may  potentially be substitutes to
he original ones: at the invention level, this might reduce the
ncentive to engage in the commercialization of the invention,
hile at the ﬁrm level, this might increase the hazard of ﬁrm fail-
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Re-examining prior empirical research results by taking these
considerations into account opens up many possible research
avenues. Despite the value of these contributions in advancing our
understanding of the role of patent scope at the invention and ﬁrm
levels, the operationalizations employed by prior research have two
main limitations. First, they do not consider that – holding the num-
ber of classes in which a patent is classiﬁed constant – the number of
patent claims can vary. Second, in measuring the number of patent
classes, prior studies have mostly used the IPC classiﬁcation, which
considers the complete technological information contained in the
patent documentation (Gruber et al., 2013; USPTO, 2014b), rather
than only the information contained in the patent claims, and so
does not distinguish between patents that are classiﬁed in multi-
ple classes because they build on diverse knowledge inputs (e.g.
patents with higher technological diversity, as in Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000, 2002), and ones that generate
new knowledge that refers to different domains (i.e. closer to the
theoretical deﬁnitions of patent scope).
Once we recognize this more nuanced picture, additional mech-
anisms emerge to explain the positive associations found by prior
studies, beyond those to which past research has attributed the
relationships. For instance, having patents classiﬁed in a higher
number of classes may  be associated with higher chances of a start-
up surviving because it might be indicative of the fact that it has
been able to develop a technology that is potentially applicable in
more domains, which may  be particularly helpful in the event that
the original idea does not succeed (e.g. Gruber et al., 2008). A ﬁrm’
ability to signal the broader applicability of its technology in the
patent document itself might even yield a premium to its valuation
by venture capitalists, who typically assess ﬁrm potential.
Similarly, in interpreting the insigniﬁcance of their results,
Harhoff et al. (2003) provide a set of possible explanations such
as the single- versus multi-industry approach or the potential dif-
ference between the US and German Patent Ofﬁces. In addition to
those explanations, the evidence in the present paper suggests that
the two dimensions of scope (i.e. patent claims and patent classes)
might not co-vary perfectly; hence, distinguishing between them
could lead to qualitatively different conclusions about the effect
of patent scope on patent value. If patents classiﬁed into more
classes were distributed between those that had many claims per
class and others that had relatively few claims per class in the
sample observed by Harhoff et al. (2003), one could observe a non-
signiﬁcant effect of more classes on patent value as they indeed
found. The former group of patents would contribute to private
value (the outcome that Harhoff et al. (2003) examined), but the
latter would not. While the authors acknowledge the lack of patent
claims among the controls as a limitation, the results from my study
suggest that adding a control for patent claims might clarify our
understanding of this relationship substantially.
5.2. Limitations
Finally, I acknowledge that there are some limitations to the
study. First, the empirical test is based on a sample of patents
developed by ﬁrms operating in the photonics industry. Although
photonics shares many features with other high-tech industries,
and the sample selected presents variety in the characteristics of
the ﬁrms it includes, it would be interesting for future research
to verify the consistency of these results across different settings.
Second, in investigating the implications of patent scope, this paper
focuses only on one performance dimension, i.e. a ﬁrm’s ability in
building on the knowledge underlying its patent. It would be inter-
esting for future research to investigate other dimensions of ﬁrm
performance more closely, making a distinction between the two
dimensions of patents scope identiﬁed in this paper. A ﬁrst step in
this direction has been made by research that has investigated the
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elationship between patent scope and patent litigations. Within
his stream, Lerner (1994) ﬁnds that the number of classes into
hich a patent is classiﬁed increases the chance that the patent
s litigated, when the number of patent claims is not included as
 control variable. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) estimate the
robability of litigation as a function of the number of classes and
he number of claims and, while they ﬁnd that litigated patents
ave higher numbers of claims, they do not ﬁnd a positive associ-
tion between the number of patent classes and the probability of
itigation. This suggests that considering the distinction between
atent claims and patent classes in determining the strength of
atent protection might lead to a better understanding of the
esults prior research has obtained in this area.
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